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Abstract
Purpose:  The study purport to investigate the effectiveness of  internal control mechanisms,
investigate  whether  evidence  of  agency  problem  is  found  among  banks  in  Europe  and
determine how internal controls affect credit risk.
Design/methodology: Panel data from 91 banks from 23 European Union countries were
studied  from  2008-2014.  Hausman’s  specification  test  suggest  the  use  of  fixed  effects
estimation technique of  GLS. Quantitatively modelled data on 15 variables covering elements
of  internal controls, objectives of  internal controls, agency problem, bank and country specific
variables were used.
Findings: There  is  still  high  credit  risk  in  spite  of  measures  being  implemented  by  the
European Central Bank. Banks have individual entity factors that increase or decrease credit
risk. The study finds effective internal control systems because objectives of  internal controls
are  achieved  and  significantly  determine  credit  risk.  Agency  problem  is  confirmed  due  to
significant positive relation with credit risk. There is significant effect of  internal controls on
credit  risk with specific  variables as risk assessment, return on average risk weighted assets,
institutional ownership, bank size, inflation, interest rate and GDP.
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Research  limitations/implications:  Missing  data  prevented  the  use  of  strongly  balanced
panel. The lack of  flexibility with using quantitative approach did not allow further scrutiny of
the nature of  variables. However, statistical tests were acceptable for the model used. The study
has implications for management and owners of  banks to be warry of  agency problem because
that provides incentive for reckless high risk transactions that may benefit the agent than the
principal. Management must engage in actions that profile the company better and enhances
value maximization. Rising default risk has tendency to impair corporate image leading to loss
of  reputational capital.
Originality/value: The study provides the use of  quantitative approach to measuring certain
phenomena within the discipline of  internal controls. The study adds to a previous study by
same authors and confirming the agency problem in a different approach.
Keywords: Agency problem, Credit risk, Internal controls
Jel Codes: G21, G32
1. Introduction
Stakeholders in the financial system have revised their risk preferences, perceptions and consciousness
after  the  global  financial  crisis.  Much  awareness,  attention  and  concern  have  been  shown  in  the
operations of  banks following lessons the global financial crisis in 2007 (Shin & Kim, 2015).Specifically,
participants in the banking industry have demonstrated keen interest in the activities of  banks especially
their asset, liquidity and risk transformation functions. In the credit granting process, banks officials
may exhibit opportunistic tendencies which could lead to the risk of  default. Management at times
exploit  their  informational  economies  to the  disadvantage of  the  organization thus  deepening  the
agency problem. The consequences of  such misbehaviour could surface initially in the form of  rising
non-performing loans, financial distress, insolvency, bankruptcy and failure. The aggregate result of
such unpleasant situations at the firm, country and international levels could bring about financial crisis
globally. This is because investments could be lost at each point of  these trajectory of  difficulties banks
go through. Bank systemic risks are interconnected and their effect extend beyond the industry to the
domestic and international economies.  The failure of  a single financial  institution creates failure in
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other parts of  the financial system (Rötheli, 2010). The global financial crisis is a typical case in point.
Within the financial services industry, there are many identifiable risks. Doerig (2003) stated that almost
all  activities  of  financial  institutions  have human interface thus exposing the  institution to various
human-related risks. 
There  have  been several  developments  in  the  banking  industry  emanating  from policies  from the
European Central Bank which have affected the demand and supply of  credit within the region. Credit
rationing of  various forms have surfaced in the post-crisis era in attempt to control the devastating
effect of  credit losses which occurred during the crisis (Balcerowicz, Rzoca, Kalina & Łaszek, 2013).
The writers report that the credit risk of  companies increase whenever it becomes too risky to lend to
government. This is exactly the situation in the European Union area because some countries are not
attractive to seek credit from banks thus compelling the European Central Bank to put in place series
of  measures and monetary policies to hold them in check. Banks within the EU region are deleveraging
than derisking until between 2013 and 2014 which has seen upsurge in the total risk weighted assets
(European Banking Authority Risk Assessment Report, 2015). There are some impeccable results being
achieved in some portions of  asset quality of  banks within the region, some critical areas still need to
be  tightened to  ensure  full  recovery  from credit  losses.  From the  year  2009-2014,  the  EBA Risk
Assessment report reveal that impairments on financial assets to total operating income reduced from a
weighted average of  26.6% to 17.5%. Other ratios like impaired loans and past due to total loans and
advances and impaired financial assets to total assets saw marginal increases from 5.1 to 6.6 and 1.6 to
2.0 respectively from 2009-2014. Mesnard, Margerit, Power and Magnus (2016) reported that at the end
of  September 2015,  the two countries  which had to implement strict  capital  controls,  Greece and
Cyprus, reported NPL ratio of  more than 40%. Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and
Romania all report gross NPL ratio between 10% and 20%. These developments makes it necessary to
enforce measures to minimize credit risk exposure of  banks of  member countries. In a related post-
crisis study in Europe, Caselli, Gatti and Querci (2016) were concerned about how bank capitalization
decisions affect their risk behaviour. This study follows the same line but shows interest in how internal
controls affect credit risk. It is always the goal of  management to maximize its risk-adjusted rate of
return by maintaining credit risk within acceptable limits or parameters. Apart from the traditional loan
granting activity banks engage in some off-balance sheet transactions that increases their credit risk
exposure. Regulatory approaches to credit risk management have not always been exhaustive in their
use hence the need to enforce self-regulatory practices used by management. One of  such managerial
tools is internal controls.
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Modern day firms find themselves in a dispensation where so much focus is on cooperative behaviour
or relationship between the owners (principal) and management (agent) to ensure maximization of  firm
value. This connotes that the two parties should share common goals to the extent that the individual
personal interests are not significantly different between the principal and the agent. The rationality
theory enshrines the probability of  individuals exploiting their opportunistic tendencies by substituting
the goals of  the organization for their personal ones. The existence of  partial rationality and cognitive
limitations on the part of  individuals call for systemic coordination of  divergent visions and goals in
order to establish congruence in the goals. Internal controls systems have been widely used by most
organizations to bring the divergent goals of  management and owners to a point of  convergence. Most
of  the studies on bank credit risk focus on managing credit risk with various models rather than the use
of  internal control mechanisms. The work of  Olatunji (2009) in Nigeria centred on the impact of
internal control system in the banking sector. The focus of  that paper was internal controls and fraud
which is found under operational risk. Lakis and Giriunas (2012) did a similar study and concluded that
internal controls is a measure to deal with fraud. Our present study builds on already existing works to
provide a wider view of  internal controls covering all  the elements globally accepted and used like
COSO and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Bedard and Graham (2011) used the US Sox internal controls which focus on financial reporting. Using
internal governance for internal controls, it was found that bank internal governance determined its
performance and risk reduction (Dedu & Chitan, 2013). Ji, Lu and Qu (2015) did a study on Chinese
Sox  internal  controls  which  added  among  others  organizational  structure  and  human  resource
management. In a study on bank internal control weakness and loan loss provision (a measure of  credit
risk), it was found that banks with internal controls weakness but with sound policies reduced their loan
loss provisions with time (Cho & Chung, 2016).  Their  study did not use the elements of  internal
controls even though a relationship between internal controls and credit risk was studied. This work is
an extension of  the study by Akwaa-Sekyi and Moreno (2016) whose work was limited to Spain and
elements of  internal controls in geographical and theoretical scopes respectively. This particular study
extends  the  scope  geographically  to  the  European  Union  countries  and  theoretically  covers  the
elements and objectives of  internal controls using the revised COSO framework. The variables used in
the model have all been quantitatively measured, a situation which is a deviation from the usual primary
data approach to studying internal controls. The current study touches hardly-researched area in risk
analysis and challenges the notion that internal controls is only seen to relate to operational risk and not
credit risk.
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Jin, Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Mathieu (2013) found that if  banks comply with internal controls, they
reduce their risk taking behaviour and are less likely to experience failure. The paper examines the
effectiveness of  internal control systems, investigates whether evidence of  the agency problem exist
among banks within the European Union countries  and establishes a relationship between internal
controls and operational risk. The existence of  the agency problem or otherwise will be confirmed.
The study will go a long way to make new revelations and confirm or contrast previous research on the
relationship between internal controls and credit risk. It will also reveal how European Union banks
have learnt lessons from the crisis through the enforcement of  effective internal control systems. The
structure and effectiveness of  internal controls is evident in the reporting of  banks and this is explored
to unveil its relationship with credit risk. Thus the study reinforces prudence and cautiousness on the
part of  management even though the profit maximizing objective cannot be shirked in the process of
discharging bank critical functions. This study opens a grey area in the use of  quantitative variables to
study an area which hitherto has been studied with the use of  primary data. The rest of  the paper
covers  literature  review,  hypotheses  and  variables,  design/methodology/approach,  findings  and
conclusion.
2. Literature Review
Individuals are limited by their cognitive abilities hence cannot act beyond their levels of  cognition.
Earlier  research  which  believed  in  human relation  theories  discouraged the  control  of  individuals.
When individuals from various backgrounds with their differences find themselves in an organization,
the need o ensure congruence of  the various individual goals to the organizational goals call for a
system  that  moderate  lifestyles.  The  situation  calls  for  controlling  behaviour  at  a  micro  level
(individuals) and then at a macro level (institution). Thus two contrasting but complementary theories
provide foundations for this research. These are the agency theory (micro and individual level) and
institutional theory (macro level of  organizational behaviour). The agency theory is accredited to Jensen
and Meckling (1976) and later by Fama and Jensen (1983). The core of  the  theory is the aligning of
conflicting interests through separation of  ownership from control within the organization. Jensen and
Meckling explains the agency relationship as a contract where one party (principal) engages the services
of  another (agent) to perform a service on the former’s behalf. The trade-off  between incentives and
risk sharing is confirmed by Hart (1995). The cost associated with possible conflict of  interest between
agents and principals are known as agency costs. A managerial tool put in place to check management
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and employee misbehaviour through auditing, budgeting, compensation and other forms of  control
have proven successful in minimizing the agency costs. 
According to  Letza, Kirkbride, Sun and Small (2008), the argument underlying the agency theory is
that, managers will only act to maximize shareholder value if  only it is not in conflict with their own
personal self-interest. The agency problem can be linked to bank credit risk instances. Bank managers
in their effort to originate, fund, service and monitor credit supply may engage in certain actions or
inactions that will impair the loan portfolio leading to the loss of  assets. It is to avert such occurrences
that effective internal control systems that minimizes such losses should be in place and effectively
enforced. The institutional theory dates back in the 1970s. It is a complex view of  the organization and
how it responds to normative pressures from the internal and external environment that compels the
organization to take legitimate stance to respond to such pressures. The theory is popular in economics,
sociology and political studies (Lynne, 1987). Institutional theories emphasizes standard systems and
procedures for the conduct of  business to ensure survival of  the organization. Seeing individuals as
actors and creatures of  behaviour,  they produce and influence social  change whenever  they  come
together (Meyer, 2006). Hence it  is  not enough to control behaviour in an individualistic approach
(Jepperson  &  Meyer,  2007).  Realist  institutionalism  believes  that  some  fundamental  institutional
principles must be in place for organizations to function effectively. This is what we ascribe to, and
propose internal controls as a key fundamental practice that all organizations especially banks must
have in place and follow the provisions thereof. The study draws theoretical support from the agency
and  institutional  theories  maintaining  that,  if  there  are  measures  put  in  place  to  neutralize  the
entrenchment  of  managerial  self-interest,  control  group  behaviour  at  institutional  level  through
effective internal control systems, credit risk could be minimized.
Stakeholders  seem  to  have  some  level  of  confidence  in  firm  transparency  through  reporting,
accountability and reliable information which is enforced through effective internal control systems
(Rittenberg & Schwieger, 2001). The Committee on Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) (1992) defines
internal  controls  as the process affected by the entity’s  board of  directors,  management and other
personnel  designed  to  provide  reasonable  assurance  regarding  achievement  of  effectiveness  and
efficiency  of  operations,  reliable  financial  reporting  and  compliance  with  applicable  laws  and
regulations. Cases of  numerous corporate scandals compelled the US Congress passed a law which
gave birth to the Sarbenes-Oxley Act 2002. This law was seen as an improvement upon the COSO
framework thus giving emphasis to monitoring and reporting. It is therefore not surprising to find most
internal control research directed towards financial reporting. The SOX Act requires that management
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reports material internal control weakness to the board and external auditors. The adequacy of  internal
control systems and the attestation by independent auditors on the report by management is provided
in the Act.
Basel  Committee  on Banking  Supervision  (2010)  defined  internal  controls  as  ensuring  that  senior
management establishes and maintains an adequate and effective internal control system and processes.
The  systems  and  processes  should  be  designed  to  provide  assurance  in  areas  including  reporting
(financial  and  operational),  monitoring  compliance  with  laws,  regulations  and  internal  policies,
efficiency and effectiveness of  operations and safeguarding of  assets.  After an extensive theoretical
study of  internal controls, (Lakis & Giriunas, 2012) defined internal controls as that part of  enterprise
management  system  ensuring  the  implementation  of  goals,  effective  economic-commercial
performance of  the enterprise, observation of  accounting principles and effective control of  work risks
that enables the organization minimize the number of  intentional and unintentional mistakes, to avoid
frauds in  the process of  enterprise  performance made by authority or  employees.  Their  definition
emphasizes effective risk management just as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision definition.
International Auditing Standards define internal control as a drafted process implemented by people in
governance, management and other persons in authority in order to give reasonable assurance that
objectives  of  the  organization  regarding  credible  financial  reporting,  efficiency  and  efficacy  of
operations  and are  in  compliance with existing  laws and regulations  (Briciu,  Dănescu,  Dănescu &
Prozan, 2014). The definition focuses on the micro level of  viewing the organization and limits the
definition to control of  the individuals within the organization. Internal control is a managerial tool
which covers all set of  daily activities in all areas of  the organization, at all levels towards safe guarding
the assets, ensuring compliance and transparency, communicating material weakness, protecting stake
holder interest in order to achieve the long-term goals of  the organizational (Akwaa-Sekyi & Moreno,
2016). 
The business environment is dynamic hence changes, reviews and reengineering in policies to reflect
the changing trends are necessary. It is for no reason that the COSO framework for internal controls
has been revised in the year 2013 which pays attention to some of  the SOX Act provisions. The new
framework which was represented in a cubic shape covers the five elements (control environment, risk
assessment,  control  activities,  information  and  communication  and  monitoring),  the  objectives
(operations,  reporting  and  compliance)  and  level  (entity,  division,  operating  unit  and  function)
(McNally, 2013). The revised framework identifies seventeen principles under the five broad elements.
This  new framework  is  a  combination  of  the  SOX provision  of  communicating  material  internal
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control weakness. The other dimension of  internal controls in the revised framework is the objectives.
The  three  objectives  of  internal  control  systems  are  performance  and  operational,  reporting  and
compliance objectives (McNally, 2013). The last dimension of  internal control system is the level at
which the control systems are being applied or enforced.
Generally, internal controls minimizes the loss of  revenues, wastage of  resources and unanticipated
losses (Abbas & Iqbal, 2012). Internal controls reduces information asymmetry, promote best practices
in transparency and protect shareholders against the power of  rulers (Salhi & Boujelbene, 2012). The
observation of  sound and effective internal controls is a major driver to investor confidence and earns
the institution significant amount of  reputational capital. Jin, Kanagoretnam, Lobo and Mathieu (2013)
found  that  banks  without  proper  internal  controls  could  grow  temporarily  but  they  have  higher
likelihood of  failing in the near future. This defeats the going concern concept of  organizations of
which banks are no exception. When banks fail, there is a greater disincentive to depositors, investors
and the externalities on other banks.
The effectiveness of  internal controls have been studied along the dimensions of  the efficiency and
effectiveness of  activities, reliability of  information and compliance with laws and regulations (Jokipii,
2006).  The ability  of  internal  control  systems to achieve  its  objectives  implies  its  effectiveness.  If
internal  controls  are  unable  to ensure  operational  efficiencies,  report  appropriately  to internal  and
external stakeholders and comply with regulatory demands, it cannot be said to be effective. Internal
control systems were developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to ensure prudence
and stability in the financial system. Anecdotal evidence from numerous bank failures and even the
quite recent financial crisis gives support to the fact that credit is a major contributory factor to these
failures  (Doerig, 2003). There is the human element of  the credit granting process and that is what
internal controls seek to ameliorate. Banks benefit from transforming their liabilities into assets thus an
incentive for optimal risk benefit behaviour is pursued but bank managers owe their principals a duty
of  care (fiduciary relationship). Moral hazards and adverse selection emanates from the exploitation of
informational economies by counter parties and can best be minimized if  management is extra careful
in its asset creation function. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) reported that financial institutions with strong
internal risk controls are able to survive financial crises and refute the claim that the financial crisis did
not affect all institutions the same way as speculated by some experts in finance. It is not uncommon to
find bank managers over-ambitiously creating very risky assets (credit facilities) in the name of  higher
return  expectation.  Although  there  are  myriad  of  factors  that  contribute  to  credit  risk,  the  most
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avoidable ones could be dealt with if  there are sound and religiously-adhered-to internal controls within
the institutions. 
3. Hypotheses and variables
The explanatory variables for the study have been classified under internal control elements, objectives,
agency  problem,  bank-specific  and  country  specific  variables.  These  classification  are  meant  to
holistically deal with all the objectives of  the study. The outcome variable of  interest to this study is
credit risk.
3.1. Dependent variable
The dependent variable for the study is credit risk.
3.1.1. Credit risk
Banks for International Settlement (BIS) provide a set of  principles to enable banks manage credit risk.
The areas covered in the set of  principles include establishing appropriate credit risk environment;
operating  under  a  sound credit  granting  process;  maintaining  an  appropriate  credit  administration,
measurement and monitoring process; and ensuring adequate controls over credit risk. These principles
have semblance with the  elements  of  internal  controls  which comprises control  environment,  risk
assessment, control activities, information and communication and monitoring. There are overlaps in
ensuring that principles of  credit risk management and internal control practices are fully implemented
by bank management. Credit risk has been identified as the major deficiency to bank management and
among the three major risks facing banks (Al Tamimi & Al Mazrooei, 2007; Maltritz & Molchanov,‐ ‐
2014).  Credit  risk is  defined as the likelihood that  a  borrower  or counter party will  default  in the
conditions of  a loan agreement, contractor in denture either in part or in full (Sobehart & Keenan,
2001). Banks stand to enjoy benefits of  enjoying reputation capital, attracting more investments and
being more profitable if  they take credit risk management very serious. Banks have had unpleasant
experiences  with  rising  default  rates  and  impairment  to  entire  loan  portfolio  (Fukuda,  Kasuya  &
Akashi, 2009). The writers reported of  the warning from the Japanese government on the need for
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banks to reduce non-performing loans since it has seriously affected the financial health of  the banking
industry. In the Spanish banking industry, it was found that lenient credit terms among other factors
determines non-performing loans (Saurina & Jimenez, 2006). The cases of  rapid credit expansion and
lenient  credit  terms  are  traceable  to  weak  internal  control  structures.  The  reputation  of  banks  is
impaired by credit risk and translate into other risks especially in situations where internal governance
mechanisms  are  very  weak  (Haq,  Faff,  Seth  &  Mohanty,  2014).  It  is  not  for  no  reason  that  the
European Central Bank has put in place series policies and regulatory mechanisms to keep credit risk
very minimal among member countries. This makes credit risk an important issue for banks to deal
with and we therefore use it as the dependent (outcome) variable around which internal controls and
other bank specific factors revolve. From the discussions above, we conjecture a relationship between
internal controls and credit risk and therefore hypothesize that:
H1: Internal controls significantly reduce credit risk
3.2. Elements of  internal controls
The  elements  of  internal  controls  are  control  environment,  risk  assessment,  control  activities,
information and communication and monitoring. 
3.2.1. Control environment
The  control  environment  covers  demonstration  of  commitment  to  integrity  and  ethical  values,
exercising oversight responsibilities, establishing structures, authority and responsibility, demonstrating
commitment to competence and enforcing accountability. The control environment sets the tone to
control the consciousness of  people within the organization to adhere to best practice, be ethical in the
conduct of  business and operate within the confines of  rules (Coca-Cola Amatil, 2011). We measure
the  control  environment  by  board  size.  It  was  reported  that  board  characteristics  improves  upon
enforcement of  internal control mechanisms and helps reduce firm risk behaviour (Ahmad, Abdullah,
Jamel  &  Omar,  2015).  Board  size  influences  the  effectiveness  of  supervisory  board  or  senior
management with mixed report in favour of  large board size (Chen & Al-Najjar,  2012) and others
against large board size (Uwuigbe & Fakile, 2012). We hypothesize that:
H2: Control environment minimizes credit risk among banks
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3.2.2. Risk assessment
Under risk management, companies should specify suitable objectives, identify and analyse risks, assess
fraud risk and identify and analyse significant change. Organizations must be familiar with the very risks
that hinders it from achieving its objectives (Abbas & Iqbal, 2012). The expertise and experience of
management and board members and their ability to identify, measure, monitor and evaluate risks goes
a long way to reduce the consequences of  bank risks. It was found that risk assessment significantly
affected credit risk among banks in Spain (Akwaa-Sekyi & Moreno, 2016). We measure risk assessment
by the ratio of  risk weighted assets to total assets and hypothesize that:
H3: Risk assessment reduces credit risk
3.2.3. Control activities
The  control  activities  comprise  selecting  and  developing  control  activities  in  general  and  over
technology  and deploying  policies  and procedures.  It  concerns  taking precautionary  measures  and
determining acceptable risk tolerance levels  through policies,  checks and balances (Abbas & Iqbal,
2012). Bank control activities was found to significantly minimize credit risk (Akwaa-Sekyi & Moreno,
2016). We measure control activities by staggered board which is a policy to minimize the dilution of
board composition and hypothesize that:
H4: Control activities has significant negative effect on credit risk
3.2.4. Information and communication
The next  internal  control  element  is  information  and communication  and this  covers  the  use  of
relevant information and communicating internally (to functional areas) and externally (stakeholders)
through various reports (Abbas & Iqbal, 2012). Banks earn reputational capital when they are able to
provide reliable timely information to internal and external stakeholders (Zhang, Zhou & Zhou, 2007).
We measure this variable with how prompt company annual reports are released. We hypothesize that:
H5: Information and communication significantly affects bank credit risk
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3.2.5. Monitoring 
Monitoring  is  about  conducting  on-going  and/or  separate  evaluations  and  evaluating  and
communicating deficiencies (McNally, 2013). It is expected that management and board demonstrate
capacity to ensure that internal control systems are followed. The managerial tool used to monitor the
organization  is  the  reporting  of  material  internal  control  weakness  (Basel  Committee  on Banking
Supervision,  2010).  We  measure  monitoring  with  bank’s  ability  to  report  material  internal  control
weakness and hypothesize that:
H6: Monitoring significantly reduce bank credit risk
3.3. Objectives of  internal controls
The  objectives  of  internal  controls  are  efficiency  and  operational  performance,  reporting  and
compliance  objectives.  Internal  control  systems  have  objectives  of  ensuring  higher  performance
through sustainable levels of  profitability (McNally, 2013). The achievement of  performance, reporting
and compliance objectives is an indication of  effective internal control systems. Managerial efficiency is
seen in their ability to manage cost in proportion to income and it is the only way the firm can survive
and  be  sustainable.  Within  the  European  Union,  it  was  reported  that  profitability,  capitalization,
efficiency and liquidity are inversely and significantly related to bank risk (Balcerowicz et al., 2013). We
measure the objectives of  internal controls by cost to income ratio, return on risk weighted assets and
loan to deposit ratio. Return on risk weighted assets reflect how bank returns are changed through the
economic cycle (Papa, 2015). He reports a declining return on risk weighted assets in the European
Union between 2005 and 2012 which  he  attributes  to the  region’s  shift  from Basel  I  to Basel  II
requirements.  In other studies,  return on risk weighted assets is  said to be the single most reliable
measure of  bank performance (Sinn, D’Acunto & Oldrini, 2013). The desire for higher returns and
profitability have incentives for engaging in risky transactions and hence increase bank credit risk whilst
efforts to ensure compliance with regulations, internal laws and limits turn to reduce credit risk (Akwaa-
Sekyi & Moreno, 2016). We make three hypotheses on the objectives of  bank internal control systems:
H7: Return on risk weighted assets significantly increase bank credit risk
H8: Performance objective increases bank credit risk
H9: Compliance objectives reduces bank credit risk
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3.4. Agency problem
The agency problem is the conflict of  interest between the principal (owners) and agent (management).
It is the bedrock for the institution of  internal control systems. Better investor protection measures like
institutional ownership and insider ownership may lead to taking riskier but value maximizing decisions
in the firm (John, Litov & Yeung, 2008). Banks engage in further actions to align the divergent interests
of  management  and  shareholders  (Lee  Weon,  2011).  Lee  provide  further  evidence  that  insider
ownership does not only reduce risk taking behaviour but also increases the value of  the firm. This
they do by having insider ownership so that management will be motivated to profile the company in
an enviable way and safeguard the assets of  the company (Goncharov & Jochen, 2006). Where there is
insider  ownership,  it  is  supposed  to  be inversely  correlated to  credit  risk.  Usually  when there  are
institutional  owners,  the  extent  of  corporate  practice,  adherence  to  rules  and  regulations,  ethical
behaviour is higher than when there are no institutional owners. Ellul and Yerramilli (2011) did not find
institutional ownership to significantly affect bank internal risk control but García-Marco and Robles-
Fernández (2008) found otherwise. We measure agency problem by the percentage of  institutional and
insider ownership and state two hypotheses that:
H10: Institutional ownership inversely relate to credit risk
H11: Insider ownership reduces bank credit risk
H12: There is no agency problem among banks in the European Union.
3.5. Bank-specific factors
Banks have certain characteristics that makes them unique among others in the industry. These unique
characteristics determine their exposure to risks and its attendant consequences (Haq, 2010). In his
study of  fifteen European countries, Haq found that bank characteristics significantly determined their
risks especially equity risk and credit risk. In this study, the bank characteristics considered are bank size
and bank age. Larger banks have the potential to absorb the shocks of  credit risk better than smaller
banks. It was reported that larger banks have better internal control systems (Laeven & Levine, 2009),
variety  of  credit  products  for  its  clients  (Eling  & Marek,  2014)  whilst  smaller  firms  do not  have
incentive to improve upon internal control mechanisms (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins & Kinney, 2007). It
is the same with the age of  the bank. Banks that have been in operation for long might engage in some
activities that will  minimize or increase the effect of  credit risk. Experience in the business terrain
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insulates them from certain risks which new entrants may hardly escape. Banks that have long years of
existence have lesser signs of  material internal control weakness than new ones (Tang, Tian & Yan,
2014). We therefore hypothesize that:
H13: Bank-specific factors significantly reduce credit risk
3.6. Country-specific variables 
There are country-specific characteristics that affect bank credit risk. Inflation, interest rate and GDP
are major  factors  that  affect  the  demand and supply  of  credit  in  the  financial  system.  The  gross
domestic product of  a country has relationship with demand and supply of  credit and its attendant
risk. It was reported by Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Wolff  (2013) that when credit becomes expensive or
decline in supply, it stifles the growth of  a country’s GDP. There are other views that when a crisis is
preceded by a boom in the credit industry, there is almost no correlation between bank credit and
recovery  of  economies (Takáts  & Upper,  2013).  It  was reported that  macro-economic factors had
significant relation with credit risk of  a country (Jakub, 2007).
H14: Gross Domestic Product of  a country affect credit risk
H15: Rate of  inflation in a country affect credit risk
H16: Interest rates in a country affect credit risk
4. Design/Methodology/Approach
The  study  design  is  purely  a  quantitative  approach  to  establish  the  relationship  between  internal
controls and credit risk. The statement and statistical test of  hypotheses makes our study a deductive
approach. Secondary data was obtained from Bankscope, SNL Financials,World Bank Reports, country
central bank reports and bank annual and corporate governance reports for 91 banks from 23 countries
from  the  period  2008-2014.  Although  the  data  is  not  a  perfectly  balanced  panel  due  to  data
unavailability  for  some  banks  in  some  years  for  some  variables,  the  data  passed  reliability  and
robustness tests thus making the results very reliable. We perform robustness checks in order to deal
with heteroskedasticity. Reliability of  information and communication was a constant term because all
the banks were prompt with the release of  their annual reports and other communications.
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4.1. Empirical models
We propose a general equation for the study that credit risk is a function of  internal controls. For panel
data analysis, the generalized least squares regression using random or fixed effect model, a general
equation  that  encompasses  individual  and time-specific  effects  is  proposed.  Bank  heterogeneity  is
accounted for  by  fixed or  random effects.  Fixed effect  models  account  for  time-invariant  omitted
variables that can affect the dependent variable with the assumption that individual entity (bank) error
term correlates with the predictor variables (Torres-Reyna, 2007). The sample of  91 different banks
from 23 countries have different unique characteristics such as national and firm policies, severity of
impact of  global financial crisis, macroeconomic policies and investor protection policies to minimize
agency  costs.  However,  fixed  effects  of  time-invariant  variables  can  only  be  controlled  but  their
coefficients cannot be estimated with fixed effect. Time-invariant characteristics of  entities are perfectly
collinear with entity’s dummies. If  individual error terms are correlated, then fixed effect model might
not be appropriate but random effect. Random effect model assumes that the variation across entities is
random  and  uncorrelated  with  the  predictors  (Green,  2008).  Random  effect  models  assume  that
differences across entities  may affect  the dependent  and allows for the inclusion of  time-invariant
variables in the model. The controversy over choice is resolved by running a Hausman test to confirm
which model is appropriate. This equation is further decomposed to arrive at the overall model that
contains all the independent and control variables using their proxies. From equation (1)
CRikt = α0ikt+ β1ᵡikt+Φ2ᵡikt+λ3ᵡikt+ψ4ᵡikt +ε (1)
where  α,β,Φ,λ,ψ  =  parameters  for  the  constant,  internal  control  elements  and  objectives,  agency
problem, bank-specific factors and country-specific characteristics respectively
CRikt =α0ikt+β1iktIntCont+Φ2iktAgency+λ3iktBankXtics+ψ4iktCountXtis+ε (2)
IntCont = f(contEnvt, RiskAss,ContAct, InfComm, Monit, OpPerf, Compl) (2.1)
Agency problem = f(instiOwn, InsidOwn) (2.2)
Bank characteristics = f(Bank Size, Bank Age) (2.3)
Country characteristics = f(Inflation, Interest rate, GDP) (2.4)
We superimpose all the variables into a general equation
CRikt =α0ikt+β1iktcontEnvt+β2iktRiskAss+β3iktContAct+β4iktInfComm+ β5iktMonit+ (3)
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β6iktOpPerf+β7iktCompl+Φ1iktinstiOwn+Φ2iktInsidOwn+λ1iktBankSize+λ2iktBankAge+ 
ψ1iktInflation+ψ2iktInterestrate+ψ3iktGDP+ε
where CRikt = credit risk for bank ‘i’, from country ‘k’ at time period ‘t’
the subscripts i denotes banks (i= 1,2,3,4……. 91), k represent country (1,2,3,4…23), t represent time
period (t= 2008, 2009, 2010…. 2014) α,β,Φ,λ,ψ are the parameters to be estimated (explained above)
and ε represent the idiosyncratic error term.
Category  Variables Proxy variables Expected sign
Dependent variable Credit risk Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans  
Independent variables 
Internal control 
elements
 
 
 
 
Control environment Board size measured by number of  board members -
Risk assessment Risk Weighted Assets/Total Assets as reported by SNL Financials -
Control activities Staggered board= dummy (1) if  a bank has staggered and (0) if  it has not -
Information and communication Timeliness of  financial information and adherence to international standards -
Monitoring 
Reporting material internal control 
weakness= dummy (1) if  a bank reported 
material internal controls and (0) if  they 
did not
-
Internal control 
objectives
Operational performance  Return on average risk weighted assets as reported by SNL Financials +
Managerial efficiency Cost/Income ratio +
Compliance Loans to deposit ratio -
Agency problem Institutional ownership  Percentage of  institutional owners -Insider ownership Percentage of  insider owners -
Bank characteristics Bank size Logarithm of  total assets +/-Bank age Number of  years in business +/-
Country characteristics
 
Inflation Country reported figure +/-
Interest rate Country reported figure +/-
GDP Country reported figure +/-
Table 1. Variables description and measurement
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Country Frequency Percent
Austria 8 1.5
Greece 35 6.4
Hungary 14 2.6
Ireland 7 1.3
Italy 105 19.2
Macedonia 7 1.3
Malta 7 1.3
Netherlands 7 1.3
Poland 63 11.5
Portugal 14 2.6
Romania 14 2.6
Bulagaria 6 1.1
Slovakia 6 1.1
Spain 46 8.4
Sweden 12 2.2
UK 23 4.2
Croatia 14 2.6
Cyprus 12 2.2
Czeck 7 1.3
Denmark 84 15.4
Finland 12 2.2
France 22 4.0
Gernmany 20 3.7
Total 546 100.0
Table 2. Sampled countries
5. Descriptive statistics 
The mean non-performing loans for the countries about 10.4% which is comparatively reducing, even
though Mesnard et al. (2016) have reported huge figures for some individual countries in Europe.  The
standard  deviation  and  errors  shows  relatively  smaller  variability  apart  from cost/income  (23.6%)
institutional ownership (23.9%) and risk weighted assets to total assets (20.5%), the dataset on credit
risk is peaked around the mean. It could generally be seen from the dataset that apart from dummy
variables,  other  metric  variables  shows  consistency  between the  two central  tendencies  (mean and
median).  Banks within the  region have better  investor protection mechanisms through institutional
ownership (23.1%), insider ownership (1.2%) and also report material internal control weakness. There
is relatively about 1% return on average risk weighted which was reported by (Papa, 2015) as the true
measure of  bank performance.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
6. Findings
In order to decide on which estimation model to choose between fixed or random effect, Hausman test
was run. This specification test basically tests whether unique errors are correlated with the regressors,
with the null hypothesis saying they are not (Green, 2008). The test pre-sets a null hypothesis that
random effect is preferred over the alternative fixed effect and the criteria is a rejection of  the null
hypothesis if  the probability value is less than the set confidence interval. The hypothesis predicts that
random effect  is  same as  fixed  effect.  To  perform the  test,  fixed  effect  model  is  run  where  the
dependent variable (credit risk measured by npl/total loans) is regressed over the set of  internal control
elements, objectives, agency problem, bank and country characteristics. The result is stored and the
random effect model is also run. Hausman specification test is run over fixed and random and the
result will which model is appropriate. It can be seen from the result that the test is significant at 1%
confidence interval (p=0.0000). This means that we reject the null hypothesis that unique errors are not
correlated with the regressors. The result suggest a choice of  fixed effect over random effect since the
test that the difference in coefficients are not systematic is rejected.
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Table 4. Hausman specification test results 
The result of  the test suggest that fixed effect model will  be better than random effect.  There are
upcoming works that have challenged the Hausman specification test claiming its biasness towards to
fixed effect (Bell & Jones, 2015) claiming that what fixed effect can do, random effect can even do
better. We seem to agree with such school of  thought to some extent. This is because the random
effect gives better prediction power and significant levels for key variables of  interest in our case but
the Hausman test suggest otherwise. Rejecting the use of  random effect for fixed effect seem to us like
throwing away the water in the pan with the baby. 
We control for heterogeneity with fixed effect model by running a robustness check on the standard
errors. The result of  the fixed effect regression can be found in Table 5. There were 91 banks with 534
observations with average observation per group of  5.9 in the panel. The robust fixed effect model
omits  two  variables  (insider  ownership  and staggered  boards).  The  errors  are  correlated  with  the
regressors (-0.5933). The F-test shows whether all the coefficients in the model are different from zero.
It could be seen from the significance level (0.000) that the coefficients are different from zero thus
confirming a good model.
-43-
Intangible Capital – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/ic.911
Table 5. Robust GLS fixed effect regression results
The intra-class correlation measured by ‘rho’ suggest that 79.2% of  the variance is due to differences
across panels.  The ‘t-value’ test the hypothesis that each coefficient is  different from zero and this
hypothesis is rejected when the t-value is higher than 1.96 for 95% confidence interval. It is only in this
case that the variable can be said to be significant and important in explaining the dependent variable.
This means, the higher the t-value, the better for that particular variable. It could be seen from the
result that each of  the category of  variables in the model significantly affect credit risk. The internal
control  elements,  internal  control  objectives,  agency  problem,  bank  characteristics  and  country
characteristics all have significant effect on credit risk. The internal control element, risk assessment is
significance (0.025) and negatively affect credit risk even though the correlation is weak. The result
confirms earlier research that good risk assessment reduces risk exposure (Abbas & Iqbal, 2012) but
contrary to an earlier study by Akwaa-Sekyi and Moreno (2016) who rather found a positive correlation.
The effectiveness of  internal controls is determined by its ability to achieve the objectives. It is found
from the study that operational performance objectives of  internal controls is significant but inversely
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related to credit risk which is contrary to our hypothesis. The result is rather in tandem with the claim
that profitability and efficiency is inversely related to bank risks (Balcerowicz et al., 2013). Institutional
ownership shows high significance to credit risk. It  is  rather interesting to find that it  is  positively
related to credit risk. It was expected that a significant negative relation exist between agency problem
variables and the dependent variable. The result is not different from the situation in Spain when it was
found that good board characteristics could not reduce credit risk of  banks (Akwaa-Sekyi & Moreno,
2016). The hypothesis that there is no agency problem among banks in Europe cannot sustained. Bank
characteristics shows significant negative effect on credit. Measured by bank size, the result shows that
larger banks are able to minimize credit risk than smaller banks. The result confirms previous research
that  bank size  significantly  reduce  bank risk  taking  behaviour  (Haq,  2010).  Again,  the  report  that
smaller banks have disincentive to enforce internal control mechanisms (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007)
as compared to larger ones is confirmed. All the country-specific variables showed significant negative
relation  with  credit  risk  apart  from  GDP  which  was  positive.  There  is  reason  to  agree  that
macroeconomic environment has significant relation with credit risk within a country (Jakub, 2007).
The explanatory power of  the model provides better results for the within than the overall. The model
shows that 30.4% of  changes in a bank’s credit risk is explained by internal controls. Interesting, the
results for between and overall explanatory power of  the model is about 1%. This is not strange in
regression results and does not suggest the model is not good because necessary assumptions and tests
have suggested suitability of  the model.
7. Conclusions
It can be concluded from the study that there are effective internal control systems among banks in
Europe because the objectives of  operational performance and compliance are achieved. Normally,
when internal controls are effective, there should be no evidence of  the agency problem. Contrary to
this, there is the agency problem existing among banks in Europe and this support our earlier finding
about banks in Spain. The study provides no guarantee for effective internal control systems as panacea
to the absence of  agency problem. There seem to suggest more and subtle conflict of  interest among
banks within Europe.  Significantly,  internal  control elements,  objectives,  agency problem, bank and
country characteristics affect credit risk. The revised COSO framework for internal controls provides a
comprehensive approach to dealing with loss of  assets.  It  is  however not exhaustive but could be
complemented  with  specific  approaches  to  minimizing  the  agency  problem.  The  inclusion of  the
agency  problem  in  this  model  gives  credence  to  our  assertion.  The  study  has  implications  for
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managerial and shareholder decisions regarding how to safeguard assets of  banks. The social cost of
loss of  investments through credit risk and the possible of  businesses is worth knowing.
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